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Kline: Revitalizing the Ban on Conversion Therapy

REVITALIZING THE BAN ON CONVERSION THERAPY:
AN AFFIRMATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CONVERSION THERAPY BANS
Logan Kline

INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause stands as a
foundational pillar of the United States legal system.1 The First
Amendment decrees that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the
freedom of speech.”2 But how far does this right extend? This question
has fueled one of the most hotly contested and time-honored legal debates
in American jurisprudence.3 While freedom of speech is granted
expansive protections, the Supreme Court of the United States has
unquestionably defined its limitations.4 As far back as 1919, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously explained that as expansive as the First
Amendment is, it still does not protect a man who falsely shouted fire in
a theatre to cause a frenzy.5 Although the Supreme Court has answered a
variety of major free speech questions in the intervening century since
Holmes’ opinion, the debate over freedom of speech limitations in more
nuanced contexts rages on the modern judicial stage. Put plainly,
American jurisprudence has yet to reach consensus on when an
individual’s freedom of speech rights end and the government’s interest
in regulating speech begins.6
Engaging with this time-honored debate, this Article examines one
such split among the Federal Circuit Courts: whether freedom of speech
protections extend into the office of a therapist. Specifically, that split
centers on whether state laws prohibiting licensed therapists from
providing conversion therapy violate those therapists’ First Amendment
freedom of speech rights. The speech at issue—conversion therapy—is a
1. U.S. Const. amend I.
2. Id.
3. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
4. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
5. Id.
6. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam.
and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014),
abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Otto v. City of
Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 2020). These cases exemplify the dissonance within the
federal judiciary surrounding the line where personal liberties give way to state interests, specifically with
reference to the content of this Article.
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practice that attempts to change the sexual orientation or gender identity
of an LGBTQ+ individual, often a minor.7 Until recently, the Third and
Ninth Circuits had consistently upheld such restrictions. 8 However, the
Supreme Court in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v.
Becerra signaled a potential jurisprudential shift when it struck down an
exception to free speech called “professional speech,” which the Third
and Ninth Circuits had relied on in their opinions.9 Subsequently, in 2020,
the Eleventh Circuit in Otto v. City of Boca Raton split with the Third and
Ninth Circuits, holding that a statutory ban on conversion therapy violated
the First Amendment, because even if the speech was controversial, it was
protected from government regulation.10
Part I of this Note examines the scientific landscape as well as the legal
and real-world implications of the controversial practice of conversion
therapy. Next, Part II addresses the legal reasoning in support of bans on
conversion therapy by analyzing the decision of the Ninth Circuit in
Pickup v. Brown and of the Third Circuit in King v. Governor of N.J.11
From there, Part III presents the opposing argument that bans on
conversion therapy are unconstitutional and violate the First
Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause. Part III first examines the
Supreme Court’s decision in National Institute of Family and Life
Advocates v. Becerra and then analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s recent
decision in Otto v. City of Boca Raton.12 Finally, Part IV argues that even
in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Becerra, the ban on conversion
therapy should be deemed constitutional because therapy is a mental
health treatment rather than speech, and a ban on conversion therapy
constitutes a government interest sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.
I. ISSUE BACKGROUND AND STAKES
Before diving into the legal analysis surrounding whether conversion
therapy qualifies as protected speech under the First Amendment, an
understanding of the scientific landscape of the therapy is necessary. In
freedom of speech analyses, the context of the speech is vital to a court’s
7. Christy Mallory et al., Conversion Therapy and LGBT Youth, UCLA WILLIAMS INST. (June
2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Conversion-Therapy-Update-Jun-2019.
pdf.
8. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014),
abrogated by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
9. National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361, 2371-73 (2018).
10. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 2020).
11. King, 767 F.3d 216; Pickup, 740 F.3d 1208.
12. National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361, 2371-73 (2018);
Otto, 981 F.3d 854.
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determination of the extent of protection that should be afforded to that
speech.13 This Part first defines conversion therapy, providing statistics
on both the number of individuals subjected to it and states that have
banned the practice. Then, this Part explains the scientific community’s
consensus regarding conversion therapy.
Conversion therapy is a controversial practice which seeks to change
the sexual orientation or gender identity of an individual, often a minor.14
Conversion therapy is grounded in the belief that LGBTQ+ is abnormal
and that treatment can change the orientation or gender identity of an
LGBTQ+ individual.15 Twenty states, Washington DC, and Puerto Rico
have banned or restricted healthcare professionals from using conversion
therapy on minors.16 Research shows that as of 2019, 698,000 adults in
the United States have been exposed to conversion therapy and about half
of those adults were subjected to the practice during adolescence.17
Throughout the extensive history of conversion therapy in the United
States, a variety of techniques have been employed by both healthcare
professionals and religious advisors.18 While talk therapy is currently the
most common type of conversion therapy, other more gruesome and
dangerous tactics are still employed by some practitioners.19 Conversion
therapy can generally be divided into two categories: aversive and nonaversive.20 Aversive “therapies” can include torturous practices such as
inducing nausea, vomiting, or paralysis, providing electric shocks, or
having the individual snap an elastic band around their wrist when
aroused by same-sex thoughts.21 Meanwhile, non-aversive techniques
include hypnosis, reframing, and redirecting thoughts.22
While twenty states have banned conversion therapy, thirty others still
13. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (establishing
the test for student speech in public schools); Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
576 U.S. 200 (2015) (evaluating government speech for a free speech analysis); C. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (establishing a First Amendment analysis for
commercial speech restrictions).
14. Mallory, supra note 7.
15. Id.
16. The Lies and Dangers of Efforts to Change Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, (last accessed February 20, 2021) (listing the states that have banned conversion
therapy: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia,
Vermont, and Washington).
17. Mallory, supra note 7. This range only includes adults between the ages of eighteen and fiftynine. There are likely even more adults above this age range, and there are thousands of youths currently
be subjected to conversion therapy.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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allow the practice, despite the myriad of national organizations that
openly oppose conversion therapy and support legislative prohibitions of
it.23 According to the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry:
[There is] no evidence to support the application of any ‘therapeutic
intervention’ operating under the premise that a specific sexual orientation,
gender identity, and/or gender expression is pathological. Furthermore,
based on the scientific evidence, the AACAP asserts that such ‘conversion
therapies’ (or other interventions imposed with the intent of promoting a
particular sexual orientation and/or gender as a preferred outcome) lack
scientific credibility and clinical utility. Additionally, there is evidence that
such interventions are harmful. As a result, ‘conversion therapies’ should
not be part of any behavioral health treatment of children and
adolescents.24

The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry is far from
alone in this stance. In fact, the vast majority of medical and psychiatric
associations condemn conversion therapy and support legal prohibitions
of the practice.25
In short, the national scientific community has reached a near
consensus: conversion therapy is not only ineffective in achieving its
stated purpose but also can be extremely harmful to those subjected to
it.26 People who have undergone conversion therapy report higher rates of
anxiety, depression, and other mental health conditions.27 Therefore, the
discussion of whether a state can ban licensed therapists from practicing
conversion therapy has greater stakes than the academic discourse
constrained to the halls of a law school building. In states without
conversion therapy bans, thousands of people are subjected to this

23. Conversion Therapy Bans by U.S. State, BORN PERFECT (Last accessed April 18, 2021),
https://bornperfect.org/facts/conversion-therapy-bans-by-state/.
24. The AACAP Policy on “Conversion Therapies, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY (2018).
25. Policy and Position Statements on Conversion Therapy, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (last
accessed Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/resources/policy-and-position-statements-on-conversiontherapy. Other national organizations that have condemned the practice and/or openly supported
legislative restraint of conversion therapy include: the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, the American College of Physicians, the American
Counseling Association, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association,
National Association of Social Workers, the American Psychological Association, and many more.
26. The Lies and Dangers of Efforts to Change Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (last accessed February 20, 2021); Conversion Therapy, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW
CENTER (last accessed Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.splcenter.org/issues/lgbt-rights/conversion-therapy
(“People who have undergone conversion therapy have reported increased anxiety, depression, and in
some cases, suicidal ideation. It can also strain family relationships, because practitioners frequently
blame a parent for their child’s sexual orientation.”).
27. Id.
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emotionally abusive practice each year.28 In light of these high stakes,
several Federal Circuit Courts have considered arguments for and against
conversion therapy bans in recent years, leading to divergent holdings
regarding the legality of such bans between circuits.
II. LEGAL POSITION IN SUPPORT OF BAN ON CONVERSION THERAPY
In 2014, the Ninth and the Third Circuits upheld as constitutional
statewide bans on the use of conversion therapy by licensed therapists.29
This Part first outlines the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup v. Brown
that upheld California’s ban on conversion therapy.30 This Part then turns
to the Third Circuit’s holding in King v. Governor of New Jersey, where
the Third Circuit also upheld New Jersey’s ban on conversion therapy,
albeit based on a different rationale.31
In Pickup v. Brown, plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of
California Senate Bill 1172, a statewide ban on state-licensed mental
health providers engaging in “sexual orientation change efforts” (SOCE)
with patients younger than eighteen-years-old.32 The plaintiffs argued that
the ban violated the First Amendment and infringed on several other
constitutional rights.33 The Ninth Circuit first noted that the practice of
conversion therapy, or SOCE, began in a time when homosexuality was
considered an illness, which has since been debunked by the scientific
community for nearly half a century.34 Then, the Ninth Circuit identified
a wide array of topics the legislation did not restrict, noting specifically
that licensed therapists were free to say whatever they wanted about the
therapy in public or even recommend it to their patients.35 Further,
28. Mallory, supra note 7.
29. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014),
abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
30. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
31. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
32. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1223. (writing that SB 1172 did not do any of the following: “Prevent mental health
providers from communicating with the public about SOCE; Prevent mental health providers from
expressing their views to patients, whether children or adults, about SOCE, homosexuality, or any other
topic; Prevent mental health providers from recommending SOCE to patients, whether children or adults;
Prevent mental health providers from administering SOCE to any person who is 18 years of age or older;
Prevent mental health providers from referring minors to unlicensed counselors, such as religious leaders;
Prevent unlicensed providers, such as religious leaders, from administering SOCE to children or adults;
or Prevent minors from seeking SOCE from mental health providers in other states.”).
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unlicensed counselors could still practice SOCE, and therapists could
refer their patients for this treatment.36 The court framed the ban’s scope
as follows:
SB 1172 does just one thing: it requires licensed mental health providers
in California who wish to engage in “practices ... that seek to change a
[minor's] sexual orientation” either to wait until the minor turns 18 or be
subject to professional discipline. Thus, SB 1172 regulates the provision of
mental treatment, but leaves mental health providers free to discuss or
recommend treatment and to express their views on any topic.37

The legislature enacted the bill to protect minors and LGBTQ+
individuals from the “serious harms caused by sexual orientation change
efforts.”38
The Ninth Circuit then moved on to its free speech analysis of the bill.39
First, the court looked to precedent and determined that, while
communication about treatment is protected by the First Amendment, the
government has more power to regulate the act of administering the
treatment.40 Further, the Ninth Circuit held that therapists do not receive
special First Amendment protections merely because they deliver their
treatment through speech. The Court explained that while speech made
during therapy does receive some protection, it is not immune from state
regulation.41 The Ninth Circuit then established a continuum of medical
professional speech regulation, with complete protection of speech
afforded to medical professionals on one end, and no protection of speech
afforded on the other.42 The court’s task was to determine where along
this continuum of First Amendment protection the facts of the case
appropriately fit.43
On one end of the continuum was speech that is undoubtedly protected,
such as when a doctor publicly advocates a treatment.44 This type of
speech is entirely protected, as it falls within the heart of the First
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2021).
38. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1223. (citing 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 835, § 1(n)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1226-27 (citing Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd.
of Psych., 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000) and Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“Where the personal
nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising
judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted,
government regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of professional practice with only
incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such, subject to the First
Amendment’s command that ‘Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.’”).
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Amendment’s intended scope—issues of public concern communicated
to the masses.45 At the midpoint of this continuum was speech that occurs
within the doctor-patient professional relationship.46 Protection for this
speech is not absolute, as the state can prevent doctors from giving false
information or performing “quack medicine” with the threat of revoking
medical licenses.47 Therefore, the court explained that while some
protection is afforded to speech in the doctor-patient relationship, the First
Amendment tolerates much more speech regulation in this context.48 The
court defended a higher degree of regulation as appropriate under the First
Amendment because “[w]hen professionals, by means of their stateissued licenses, form relationships with clients, the purpose of those
relationships is to advance the welfare of the clients, rather than to
contribute to public debate.”49
Conversely, professional conduct falls on the opposite end of the
continuum, where speech is afforded the least amount of First
Amendment protection.50 According to the Ninth Circuit, the California
law fell at this end of the First Amendment protection continuum.51 This
meant the state’s power to regulate professional conduct was
considerable, even if that regulation resulted in an incidental effect on the
professional’s speech.52 Therefore, even though all medical treatments
utilize speech in some capacity during implementation, the state has the
power to ban a medical treatment without risk of violating the First
Amendment.53 The court analogized conversion therapy to medication
and explained that “[w]hen a drug is banned, for example, a doctor who
treats patients with that drug does not have a First Amendment right to
speak the words necessary to provide or administer the banned drug.”54
The speech that facilitates the banned act is also allowed to be regulated
in this context.55
The Ninth Circuit applied the continuum to the law in question and
concluded that SB 1172 addressed the conduct of licensed therapists and
fell into the professional conduct category—under which the government

45. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1226-27.; See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“Speech
on matters of public concern is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection.”).
46. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228.
47. Id.; See Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000 WL 1281174, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1229.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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has the most power to regulate speech.56 Therefore, the court held that
California possessed the authority through its police power to regulate the
administration of certain harmful therapies by licensed therapists. 57 In
short, the conversion therapy ban was upheld as constitutional.
That same year, the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in
evaluating the constitutionality of New Jersey’s ban on conversion
therapy in King v. Governor of N.J.58 Like in California, New Jersey’s
ban prohibited licensed therapists from engaging in conversion therapy
with persons under the age of eighteen.59 However, the Third Circuit’s
reasoning in King diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Pickup.60
In King, the Third Circuit expressly rejected the argument that conversion
therapy qualified as unprotected conduct.61 Instead, the court held that
“the verbal communication that occurs during SOCE counseling is speech
that enjoys some degree of protection under the First Amendment.”62
According to the court, this level of protection is diminished “[b]ecause
[p]laintiffs are speaking as state-licensed professionals within the
confines of a professional relationship.”63 Based on this conclusion, the
Third Circuit applied a more conventional constitutional test.64 If the New
Jersey law advanced a substantial state interest in protecting residents
from harmful professional practices and did so in the least invasive way
to serve that interest, then the prohibition would survive.65
The Third Circuit determined that the verbal communication in a
conversion therapy session was speech and that to find otherwise would
be counterintuitive and contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.66 In Holder, the Court
held that when communication of a message was at issue, the verbal
communication—such as the verbal communication in a conversion
therapy session—was considered speech rather than conduct.67 According
to the Court, the nature of the communication did not change the verbal
communication from speech to conduct.68

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
59. Id. at 221.
60. King, 767 F.3d 216; Pickup, 740 F.3d 1208.
61. King, 767 F.3d at 224.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
67. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705.
68. Id.
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Next, the Third Circuit distinguished its analysis from the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Pickup.69 The Third Circuit criticized the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Pickup for never explaining how to actually apply its
continuum to determine whether a statute regulates speech or conduct.70
Further, the Third Circuit explained that because the Ninth Circuit’s test
provided no criteria for how to decide whether verbal communication is
speech or conduct, the test is susceptible to manipulation and abuse.71
According to the Third Circuit, “[t]o classify some communications as
‘speech’ and others as ‘conduct’ is to engage in nothing more than a
‘labeling game.’”72 The court explained that speech should be evaluated
as such under the First Amendment rather than being twisted into conduct
through mental gymnastics.73 However, the court noted that merely
because something is speech does not automatically entitle that speech to
the First Amendment’s protections.74
After determining that the communication that occurs within a
conversion therapy session is speech, the Third Circuit addressed the
appropriate level of protection for this professional speech.75 Similar to
the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the midpoint of its continuum analysis,
the Third Circuit reasoned that New Jersey’s police power granted it the
right to regulate certain trades, particularly those related to public
health.76 The Third Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar that states have “broad power
to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the
practice of professions.”77 The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that the
speech involved in a conversion therapy session can be classified as
“professional speech” and is therefore entitled to a lower degree of First
Amendment protection.78 The court explained its reasoning by noting that

69. King, 767 F.3d at 226-28.
70. Id. at 228. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215–16 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (“[B]y what criteria do we distinguish between utterances that are truly ‘speech,’ on
the one hand, and those that are, on the other hand, somehow ‘treatment’ or ‘conduct’?”).
71. King, 767 F.3d at 228.
72. Id. quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1218 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
73. Id. (“Simply put, speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for purposes of the First
Amendment. Certain categories of speech receive lesser protection, or even no protection at all… But
these categories are deeply rooted in history, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against
exercising ‘freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First
Amendment.’”).
74. Id. at 229; see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
75. Id.
76. Id. citing Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910).
77. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
78. King, 767 F.3d at 232.
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most professions inevitably include communications between the client
and the professional.79 Mental health counselors in particular
communicate with their clients by necessity of their position.80 So, “[t]o
handcuff the State's ability to regulate a profession whenever speech is
involved would therefore unduly undermine its authority to protect its
citizens from harm.”81
Therefore, despite the Third Circuit’s disagreement with the Ninth
Circuit’s characterization of communication made during conversion
therapy as conduct rather than speech, the Third Circuit concluded that,
as professional speech, such communication was not afforded full First
Amendment protection.82 Unlike non-expressive conduct, which receives
no First Amendment protection, professional speech merely receives
diminished protection.83
In reviewing professional speech, the Third Circuit applied
intermediate scrutiny, whereas other forms of speech would normally
trigger strict scrutiny.84 In applying intermediate scrutiny, the court held
“a prohibition of professional speech is permissible only if it ‘directly
advances’ the State's ‘substantial’ interest in protecting clients from
ineffective or harmful professional services, and is ‘not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest.’”85 Under intermediate scrutiny, New
Jersey’s interest in protecting its citizens from ineffective and potentially
dangerous professional practices was found to be sufficient to justify the
state’s ban on conversion therapy.86
Despite disagreements regarding the proper First Amendment analysis
of state laws regulating conversion therapy, both the Ninth and Third
Circuit ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the ban.87
III. LEGAL POSITION BARRING BAN ON CONVERSION THERAPY
In the Ninth and Third Circuit opinions that upheld bans on conversion
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 233.
84. Id. at 234-35 (comparing professional speech to commercial speech, concluding that just as
intermediate scrutiny is applied to commercial speech, it should similarly be applied to professional
speech. The court concluded that A3371 falls within a category of permissible content discrimination
similar to the court’s analysis in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). The R.A.V. court
wrote that a statute does not trigger strict scrutiny “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.”).
85. Id. at 235 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm. Of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
86. Id. at 237.
87. King, 767 F.3d 216; Pickup, 740 F.3d 1208.
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therapy performed by state-licensed therapists, both courts relied on a
“professional speech” exception that allowed for lesser First Amendment
protection for therapists in their professional capacity.88 However, these
holdings were abrogated by the United States Supreme Court’s holding
in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, which
rejected the “professional speech” exception.89 Based on Becerra, the
Eleventh Circuit struck down Boca Raton and Palm Beach County,
Florida’s bans on conversion therapy in Otto v. City of Boca Raton,
Florida.90
In Becerra, the Supreme Court struck down the professional speech
exemption that was previously asserted by the Ninth and Third Circuits.91
This case evaluated the constitutionality of a California law requiring: 1)
licensed pregnancy-related clinics to give notice of publicly-funded
family planning services, and 2) unlicensed pregnancy-related clinics to
provide notice of their lack of licensure.92 Two crisis pregnancy centers
and an organization of crisis pregnancy centers brought this action,
alleging that both notice requirements violated their First Amendment
freedom of speech rights.93 Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the
opinion of the Court, rejecting professional speech as a separate category
entitled to a different level of protection.94 Justice Thomas began by
laying out the form of freedom of speech analysis that the Court does
recognize.95 He first noted that precedent distinguished between enforcing
prohibitions on content-based and content-neutral regulation of speech.96
If a regulation is found to be content-based, or based on communicative
content, it is presumptively unconstitutional unless the state can prove
that the law has been “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.”97
The Court then directly addressed the Ninth and Third Circuit opinions
that recognized professional speech as an exception to the strict scrutiny
that accompanies content-based regulations.98 However, Justice Thomas

88. King, 767 F.3d 216; Pickup, 740 F.3d 1208.
89. Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
90. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020).
91. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
92. Id. at 2365.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2372-73.
95. Id. at 2371.
96. Id.; See also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those that
target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.”).
97. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. (quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 163).
98. Id.
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noted that the Supreme Court had never recognized this professional
speech exception and thus was unwilling to exempt this category of
speech from the strict scrutiny analysis.99
While professional “[s]peech is not protected merely because it is
uttered by ‘professionals,’” the Court identified two situations in which
professional speech has been afforded less protection.100 First, a more
deferential review has been afforded to laws that require professionals to
disclose factual information.101 Second, states may regulate professional
conduct, even if that conduct incidentally involved speech.102 However,
the Court noted that neither of these two potential exceptions applied in
Becerra.103 In sum, the Court ruled that professional speech does not
trigger a lower level of scrutiny, and while there are two exceptions where
lower protection of speech is justified, neither were implicated in
Becerra.104
Two years after the Court’s decision in Becerra, the Eleventh Circuit
in Otto relied on that decision when it struck down conversion therapy
bans from the city of Boca Raton and Palm Beach County.105 In Otto, two
therapists alleged that the restrictions imposed by these laws, which
applied even to purely speech-based therapy, unconstitutionally restricted
their speech while interacting with their clients. 106 The city and county
bans were largely identical, barring covered therapists from treating
minors with:
any counseling, practice or treatment performed with the goal of changing
an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity, including, but not
limited to, efforts to change behaviors, gender identity, or gender
expression, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions or
feelings toward individuals of the same gender or sex.107

Both ordinances also contained an exception for counseling to assist those
undergoing a gender transition.108 The two plaintiffs in this case were
state-licensed therapists who, among other services, provided talktherapy counseling for minors “who [had] unwanted same-sex attraction
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n.,
436 U.S. 447, 455–456 (1978).
102. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.; See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020).
106. Id. at 859.
107. Id. at 859-60.
108. Id. at 860.
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or unwanted gender identity issues.”109 According to the plaintiffs, the
therapy sessions consisted entirely of speech, with no physical element.110
Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the ordinances banning SOCE were
content-based restrictions because they targeted specific communications
the local government disagreed with.111
First, the Eleventh Circuit determined whether the city and county
ordinances constituted content-based regulations.112 If so, that finding
would mandate strict scrutiny.113 Otherwise, intermediate or rational basis
scrutiny could serve as more deferential standards of review.114 However,
the Eleventh Circuit disposed of this question rather quickly, stating that
“because the ordinances depend on what is said, they are content-based
restrictions that must receive strict scrutiny.”115 The court noted that the
desirability of the content being restricted is immaterial, writing that if
favorable content is allowed and horrifying content is restricted, this
constitutes content-based regulation regardless of how desirable the
outcome may be.116 The Eleventh Circuit noted that this determination
was straightforward, because the regulations limited a category of
people—therapists—from communicating a message, SOCE.117 Finally,
the court noted that the content-based nature of the ordinance is codified
by the exception outlined in both ordinances for those undergoing a
gender transition.118 This exception specifically applied to gender
transition and not sexual orientation, which the court took as evidence that
the ban was not only content-based but also viewpoint-based, which is
“an egregious form of content discrimination.”119
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the local government’s contention that
the ordinances regulated conduct rather than speech.120 The court
reasoned that relabeling controversial speech as conduct is impermissible
and quoted the Third Circuit’s decision in King, noting that “the enterprise
of labeling certain verbal or written communications ‘speech’ and others
‘conduct’ is unprincipled and susceptible to manipulation.”121 However,
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 861.
112. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854, 861 (11th Cir. 2020).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 862.
117. Id. at 863.
118. Id at 864.
119. Id. quoting Rosenberger v. Rector of U. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). The Eleventh Circuit
also noted that a strong argument exists that viewpoint discrimination is per se unconstitutional, and these
bans are thus unconstitutional on their face. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 861 (quoting King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2014)).
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beyond this point of agreement, the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis diverged
from the Third Circuit’s decision in King, relying in part on the Supreme
Court’s holding in Becerra, which was decided after King.122 The
Eleventh Circuit identified Becerra as precedent for its rejection of an
attempt to regulate speech by reframing it as professional conduct and
stated that “local governments cannot rescue their ordinances by calling
the plaintiff’s speech conduct.”123
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the exception to strict scrutiny
for incidental speech entangled with regulated professional conduct.124
States have the right to regulate professional conduct, even if that conduct
involves some speech.125 However, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
argument that the exception applied in this case and instead asserted that
the therapy is carried out entirely through speech.126 Therefore, it cannot
be accurately described as conduct just to trigger a lower degree of
scrutiny.127 The court summarized its position on this issue succinctly,
writing that “the ordinances are direct, not incidental, regulations of
speech… they are not connected to any regulation of separately
identifiable conduct.”128
Further, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on its opinion from three
years earlier in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida.129 In
Wollschlaeger, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the state could not restrict
a doctor’s ability to discuss firearms and firearm safety with their
patients.130 The Otto court reasoned that, just as a law cannot restrict
whether a doctor can discuss guns with their patient, a law cannot limit a
therapist’s ability to employ conversion therapy.131
Once the Eleventh Circuit decided that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard of review, the court then evaluated whether the
ordinances were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.132 Here, the court conceded that the state indisputably had a
compelling interest “in safeguarding the physical and psychological well122. Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); King v. Governor
of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra,
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
123. Otto, 981 F.3d at 861; see generally Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361 (2018).
124. Id.
125. Id.; see Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
126. Otto, 981 F.3d at 861.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 865.
129. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020); Wollschlaeger v. Gov., Fla.,
848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
130. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d 1293.
131. Otto, 981 F.3d 854; See generally Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d 1293.
132. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020).
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being of a minor.”133 However, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that this
compelling interest did not include the power to restrict ideas the
government deemed unsuitable for children.134 According to the court,
even if preventing conversion therapy satisfied a compelling government
interest, the government still had the burden to prove the law was
narrowly tailored to that end.135 At this point, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that the burden of proof under strict scrutiny is nearly impassable, and
adequate justification is exceedingly rare under the standard.136 Even in
light of a series of studies and reports presented by the defendants and
various amici, the court found no compelling interest sufficient to justify
the bans on conversion therapy and thus struck down the bans.137
By refusing to apply a lower level of scrutiny in its First Amendment
analysis of professional speech in Becerra, the United States Supreme
Court set the stage for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Otto.138 Absent
the professional speech exception, Otto struck down bans on conversion
therapy as unconstitutional violations of therapists’ freedom of speech.139
IV. DISCUSSION
At first glance, the Supreme Court’s decision in Becerra seems to
signal the end of state bans of conversion therapy.140 In fact, the Eleventh
Circuit seems to have come to that same conclusion in Otto.141 However,
this understanding of the Becerra opinion assumes that the viability of
state bans on conversion therapy is entirely interwoven with the existence
of an exception for professional speech. On the contrary, there are two
primary arguments in a post-Becerra jurisprudence for a conversion
therapy ban to be upheld. This Part first argues that conversion therapy is
not protected by the First Amendment because it is a mental health
treatment. Therefore, it should be susceptible to regulation in the same
way that prescription of a medication may be regulated. Second, it argues
that even if conversion therapy is speech that would normally be
protected, the government has a compelling interest in protecting the
wellbeing of minors to justify a ban and satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.
133. Id. at 868 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
134. Id. (citing Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 794–95 (2011)).
135. Id. (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 at 171 (2015)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Otto v. City of
Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020).
139. Otto, 981 F.3d at 872.
140. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 105-137 and accompanying text.
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Finally, this Part identifies potential statutory language for drafting a postBecerra conversion therapy ban that would have a strong chance of being
upheld as constitutional.
A. Conversion Therapy is a Medical Procedure Rather than Speech
First, when the Eleventh Circuit characterized conversion therapy as a
form of speech rather than a medical procedure, it oversimplified the
therapy to fit a traditional First Amendment analysis. The Otto court even
acknowledged this, stating that “[t]he local governments are not entirely
wrong when they characterize speech-based SOCE as a course of conduct.
SOCE, after all, is a therapy, and plaintiffs say they want to ‘engage’ in
it.”142 The Ninth Circuit also recognized this reality in Pickup, reasoning
that the state has a right to regulate professional conduct even if that
regulation has an effect on the therapist’s speech.143 The Ninth Circuit
addressed this point and explained that a physician does not have a First
Amendment right to prescribe an illegal substance just because he says it
in words rather than jots it down.144 In that situation, the state’s regulation
of speech is incidental to the policy behind the ban—to prohibit doctors
from prescribing illegal substances.145
Administering therapy is a form of professional conduct that takes a
variety of forms, and the practice should not be shielded by the First
Amendment simply because most of the therapy manifests as speech. In
analyzing conversion therapy, the Eleventh Circuit in Otto missed the
forest for the trees.146 Certainly, the implementation of conversion therapy
is mostly verbal, but applying the veneer of First Amendment protection
to the words said in a conversion therapy session makes no more sense
than protecting the words of the doctor prescribing a banned
medication.147 The banned drug or conversion therapy are the aim of the
ban, while the speech that implements the treatment is incidentally banned
as well.
Part of the disconnect seems to stem from a reluctance to recognize
mental health as a legitimate condition that is medically treatable through

142. Otto, 981 F.3d at 865-866.
143. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. An idiomatic phrase that indicates a person has become so engrossed in the details of a
situation that they have missed the bigger picture.
147. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228 (“When a drug is banned, for example, a doctor who treats patients
with that drug does not have a First Amendment right to speak the words necessary to provide or
administer the banned drug.”).
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therapy.148 When a professional engages in conversion therapy, they are
not simply talking to their client. Instead, they are purporting to engage
in a mental health treatment. Even if this treatment is not as tangible as a
pill or narcotic, the state has an equal interest in its regulation.
B. The Government’s Interest Should Have Passed Strict Scrutiny
The Eleventh Circuit should have recognized in Otto that the
conversion therapy ban was supported by a compelling government
interest because it aimed to protect the wellbeing of children, thus
overcoming the admittedly stringent strict scrutiny standard.149 Early in
the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that “whether the government's
disagreement is for good reasons, great reasons, or terrible reasons has
nothing at all to do with [the analysis].”150 This recognition, paired with
the court’s characterization that strict scrutiny is seldom overcome,
showed the court’s unwillingness to engage in a true strict scrutiny
analysis.151 Even if one were to concede that conversion therapy is speech
and warrants strict scrutiny, the strict scrutiny analysis should be applied
as an unbiased test. Just because strict scrutiny often stands as an
impassable challenge does not mean that a court should write the analysis
off as a formality.152 The strict scrutiny standard is by no means meant to
be a forgone conclusion, but the Eleventh Circuit seems to treat it as the
death knell of the defense’s argument.153
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defense’s argument that the
conversion therapy ban constituted a compelling government interest with
circular logic and ignored the merits of the evidence presented to the
court. The court acknowledged that the psychological and physical safety
of children is undeniably a compelling governmental interest that satisfies
strict scrutiny.154 The municipalities presented numerous reports and
studies establishing the real harm posed by conversion therapy.155 Further,
countless professional organizations supported the defense’s position
148. Psychotherapy Works, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://www.apa.org/topics/psychotherapy/works.
149. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854, 880 (11th Cir. 2020) (Martin, J. dissenting)
(“Instances in which a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest are deservedly
rare. But they do exist.”).
150. Otto, 981 F.3d at 863.
151. Id.
152. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514-15 (2005) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory,
but fatal in fact’…The fact that strict scrutiny applies ‘says nothing about the ultimate validity of any
particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.’” (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995)).
153. Id.
154. Otto, 981 F.3d at 868.
155. Id. at 868-69.
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with amici and their own research.156 However, the court rejected this
evidence as empirically insufficient proof that conversion therapy caused
harm.157 The Eleventh Circuit substituted its own scientific judgment for
the countless organizations that filed amici as well as the government
defendant who presented evidence when it reached that conclusion,
constituting a major abuse of judicial discretion by the court. While
Eleventh Circuit judges are undoubtedly capable of interpreting scientific
information, the actual organizations comprising the vast majority of the
relevant professional field are infinitely more qualified to interpret this
data, and in this case, such professionals stated unequivocally that
conversion therapy is a harmful practice for minors.158 In the words of
Judge Martin, who dissented in Otto, a state’s interest in banning
conversion therapy is not only supported by the opinions of numerous
professional organizations but also “backed up by a mountain of rigorous
evidence.”159 If a scientific consensus regarding a practice’s harmfulness
cannot constitute proof of a legitimate government interest, then it is
difficult to conceive of a scenario where science could ever suffice to
support a compelling government interest.
To discredit the weight of the scientific and professional community,
the Eleventh Circuit argued that the collective judgment of professional
organizations could not be allowed to silence speech.160 The court
dubiously asserted that the First Amendment was written to prevent
majorities from silencing less powerful voices based on the content of the
latter’s message.161 In a general sense, this is of course true. The First
Amendment is meant to protect the less powerful voices from being
squashed by an authoritarian majority.162 That said, the Eleventh Circuit
used this argument as a rationale for ignoring the overwhelming evidence
offered by the scientific community regarding whether the state had
established that minors actually face real danger by undergoing
conversion therapy. Here, the majority in question is that of the scientific
consensus in opposition to conversion therapy.163 The court also justified
its decision that no compelling interest was established by noting that

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 858. Amicus briefs supporting this conclusion were filed by the National Center for
Lesbian Rights, the Southern Poverty Law Center, The Trevor Project, American Psychological
Association, Florida Psychological Association, National Association of Social Workers, National
Association of Social Workers Florida Chapter, American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy,
and many more organizations. Id. at 872-80 (Martin, J. dissenting).
159. Id. at 878 (Martin, J. dissenting).
160. Id. at 869.
161. Id.
162. Tom C. Clark, The First Amendment and Minority Rights, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (1969).
163. Policy, supra note 25.
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professional organizations change their mind on topics over time.164
Again, this flawed reasoning ignores that legislation and policy have
always evolved in conjunction with science. For instance, as the scientific
community developed a greater understanding of the harmful effects of
cigarette use, the production and sale of cigarettes became increasingly
regulated.165 While it is true that scientific organizations change positions
on topics over time, this alone is an irrational and anti-scientific
justification for ignoring the vast majority of the scientific community.166
This assertion, if drawn to its logical implication, would suggest that a
compelling interest can never be established through science, because
science is an ever-evolving field.
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that protecting the psychological
and physical wellbeing of children is undeniably a compelling
government interest.167 However, even in light of what the dissent
characterized as “a mountain of rigorous evidence” confirming the
negative effects of conversion therapy, the court held that the government
interest failed strict scrutiny.168 The court pre-ordained that this ban would
not pass strict scrutiny based on the stringent nature of this review, and
no evidence could dissuade it from its conviction.
C. States Should Look to These Decisions to Draft New, Conforming
Conversion Therapy Bans
Finally, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Becerra and the
Eleventh Circuit’s Otto decision, state legislatures seeking to protect
LGBTQ+ children should draft conversion therapy restrictions that
narrowly define the treatment to ensure the constitutionality of the law.
In order for a conversion therapy ban to survive the standards set forth
in these cases, such a law cannot limit how therapists can speak to their
clients about conversion therapy.169 A law banning all discussion relating
to conversion therapy would be plainly unconstitutional, as it would be
regulating speech rather than treatment.170 Instead, the legislation should
be drafted as narrowly as possible, banning the application of conversion
therapy to minors by state-licensed professionals.171 Therapists can
164. Otto, 981 F.3d at 869.
165. Cigarettes, FDA (last visited April 27, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/products-ingredients-components/cigarettes#regs.
166. Lies and Dangers, supra note 16.
167. Id.
168. Otto, 981 F.3d at 878 (Martin, J. dissenting).
169. See discussion supra Part II and III.
170. Otto, 981 F.3d at 879 (Martin, J. dissenting) (“[A] law banning all discussion relating to SOCE
would plainly be unconstitutional.”).
171. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (explaining that states have “broad
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therefore talk to their minor patients about conversion therapy and even
recommend conversion therapy from a non-licensed individual.172 Similar
to a doctor discussing illegal drug use with a patient during a diagnosis,
therapists would be allowed to discuss conversion therapy with minors.173
However, they would not be able to administer the therapy through any
means, including speech.
In Otto, the plaintiffs argued that the conversion therapy bans were
over-inclusive because they banned both aversive and non-aversive
therapies.174 On one hand, a ban strictly on aversive techniques would
outlaw the most abhorrent practices utilized in some forms of conversion
therapy. Aversive conversion therapy bans would almost certainly be
upheld as constitutional, as these techniques not only extend far beyond
speech but also clearly and obviously endanger the wellbeing of
minors.175 On the other hand, the harmful effects of non-aversive
conversion therapy are well-documented and clearly backed by the
weight of the professional community.176 Therefore, legislation banning
conversion therapy would be best-served by an overall prohibition
including a subsection that is separable from the larger legislation
specifically banning aversive conversion therapy.177 In this way, even if
the overarching ban is struck down as unconstitutional, the ban on
aversive techniques could still be upheld. As these aversive techniques
largely consist of physical tortuous practices such as electrical shocks or
forcibly induced vomiting, they are very unlikely to be afforded First
Amendment freedom of speech protections.178
power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.”); see
generally King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014),
abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
172. The fact that unlicensed professionals may still practice conversion therapy lends itself to the
“narrowly tailored” requirement set forth in a strict scrutiny analysis.
173. Rachael McGuirk, Should You Tell Your Doctor About Your Drug Use?, THE OHIO STATE
UNIVERSITY WEXNER MEDICAL CENTER (Aug. 19, 2020), https://wexnermedical.osu.edu/blog/shouldyou-tell-your-doctor-about-your-drug-use.
174. Lies and Dangers, supra note 16. Aversive “therapies” include inducing nausea, vomiting, or
paralysis; providing electric shocks; or having the individual snap an elastic band around their wrist when
aroused by same-sex thoughts. In contrast, non-aversive “therapies” include hypnosis and talk therapy.
175. Id.
176. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854, 879-80 (11th Cir. 2020) (Martin, J. dissenting)
(“[T]he harmfulness of nonaversive SOCE is established by the record. The Localities therefore did not
have to limit themselves to regulating aversive SOCE.”).
177. Another potential drafting solution would be to separate aversive and non-aversive therapy
bans into their own sections of the statute. The primary advantage of this approach is that the aversive
therapy ban unambiguously stands alone and thus will almost certainly be upheld if faced with a First
Amendment challenge. However, one downside to this approach is that it would be practically difficult to
draft a section banning only non-aversive therapy that would not become a target of First Amendment
challenges quickly.
178. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1226-27 (citing Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v.
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Next, potential legislation should not regulate the ability of clergy or
religious counselors to administer conversion therapy.179 A law regulating
religious administrations in this way would almost assuredly face
Establishment Clause challenges.180
Finally, the ban must be drafted to apply only to minors, whose
protection weighs more heavily in favor of a legitimate state interest.181
Legislation applying to all ages would almost certainly be found to be
overly broad, but the government interest in protecting the wellbeing of
children is well-established.182
While the above-outlined drafting guidelines far from guarantee that a
conversion therapy ban would be upheld as constitutional, they provide
the best opportunity for drafting a lawful ban under current First
Amendment freedom of speech precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
The safety and wellbeing of the nation’s youth must be placed ahead
of a conversion therapist’s right to practice a scientifically debunked
treatment. While the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause is
vital to America’s lifeblood, the Supreme Court has long acknowledged
exceptions to its protections, and a ban on conversion therapy should
undoubtedly occupy one such exception.183 A near scientific consensus
has confirmed the serious danger conversion therapy poses to minors.184
In light of the overwhelming interest in protecting children from a
harmful, outdated form of therapy, courts should uphold state laws that
prohibit state-licensed professionals from administering conversion
therapy to minors.

California Bd. of Psych., 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000); and Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir.
2002)) (stating that the government has more power to regulate the conduct that facilitates the treatment
than the speech).
179. Harry Farley, Gay Conversion Therapy: Hundreds of Religious Leaders Call for Ban, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-55326461. Interestingly, many religious leaders
and groups around the world have recently come out in support of conversion therapy bans in the United
States and United Kingdom.
180. Id. The potential Establishment Clause facet of such potential legislation is a broader issue
but is not the focus of this analysis.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
184. Policy, supra note 25.
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